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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ROBERT TODD WHITE, : Case No. 920248-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts of this case support a state constitutional 
ruling that this Court will review no-knock nighttime search 
warrants and affidavits without deference to the magistrate, for 
probable cause. 
The no-knock nighttime search warrant issued here allowed 
this most intrusive and dangerous kind of search of a home occupied 
by presumably innocent citizens; there were no probable cause 
suspects listed in the warrant. Particularly because of the dangers 
posed by no-knock nighttime search warrants, the magistrate should 
not have issued this warrant, which included an ambiguous 
description of the place to be searched, did not follow statutory 
mandates for searches involving no probable cause suspects, and was 
supported by an inadequate affidavit. 
There was no basis for a no-knock search warrant. While 
the daytime execution of the warrant apparently rendered the 
improper nighttime authorization harmless in this case, this Court 
should nonetheless publish an opinion explaining the error, so that 
the magistrate will not put citizens and police in unnecessary 
danger in the future by improperly authorizing nighttime searches. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DEFER TO THE MAGISTRATE, 
BUT SHOULD REVIEW THE AFFIDAVIT SEEKING A 
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The State argues that in no-knock nighttime search warrant 
cases, deference should flow from this Court to the trial court to 
the magistrate to the police. Respondent's brief at 13-15, 21. 
This danger posed by such a reversal of constitutional norms1 is 
demonstrated by the testimony of the officer who obtained the 
no-knock nighttime search warrant in this case: 
Last nighttime I did, someone got killed, and he 
was supposed to be asleep. So you take your best 
pick. I firmly believe it's safer at night if 
there's going to be violence. 
(T. 29). The fact that the trial court heard this testimony and 
then explicitly deferred to "police expertise" in affirming the 
issuance of this improperly issued no-knock nighttime search warrant 
demonstrates that the judicial actors and police need guidance, not 
1. While it is true that under federal standards, courts 
defer to magistrates who issue search warrants, no deference is 
given to trial courts reviewing the issuance of search warrants. 
E.g. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991). The idea of 
deferring to the police who seek the warrants goes against the 
constitutional doctrine that search warrants are to be evaluated by 
neutral and detached magistrates, who do not defer to police 
expertise, but make an independent factual analysis of probable 
cause for the issuance of the warrant. This neutral and detached 
magistrate concept is part of federal and state constitutional law. 
E.g. Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939); Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). 
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deference, from this Court. 
It should be noted that the justification that the State 
presents for deferential appellate review of search warrants differs 
considerably from the United States Supreme Court's. The reason 
that the federal review of search warrants is deferential is that 
the United States Supreme Court is afraid that if reviewing courts 
enforce the Federal Constitution, the police will be discouraged 
from seeking warrants altogether. With the "substantial basis" 
deferential standard of review for search warrants, the Court 
perversely compromises constitutional standards to encourage police 
to follow the law. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 
In contrast, the State argues, 
[A]ppellate deference is proper, as a matter of 
respect for magistrates and trial court judges. 
Those judicial officers, sworn to uphold the 
federal and state constitutions in a fashion that 
favors neither the State nor criminal suspects, 
should be presumed to have done so absent the 
clearest showing to the contrary. 
Brief of respondent at 13.2 
2. The State has explored many different justifications for 
the federal substantial basis test in two other cases, but has not 
espoused the Supreme Court's position. In State v. Ruiz, Case No. 
910514-CA, the State argued that deferential review was appropriate 
because it would promote consistent results and because the police 
who execute the warrants place themselves in danger and therefore 
deserve deference. Ruiz Respondent's brief at at 15-16. In State 
v. Rosenbaum, the State argued that the deferential substantial 
basis test was appropriate because magistrates are sworn to uphold 
the constitutions, because non-deferential appellate review might 
cause the magistrates to issue the warrants without analysis, 
because magistrates may be more objective than reviewing courts, 
because deferential review promotes consistent results, and because 
non-deferential appellate review is more likely to set guilty 
defendants free. Rosenbaum Respondent's brief at 13-14. 
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If the trial courts are deferring to the issuance of the 
warrants under the Gates analysis, they are not enforcing the 
constitutions. This Court can determine whether the police, 
magistrates and trial courts are upholding their constitutional 
duties by simply reading no-knock nighttime search warrants and 
affidavits for probable cause, without any presumptions or pretenses. 
Because of this Court's ability to publish opinions to 
guide the lower courts, magistrates, and police in these critical 
cases, this Court should review no-knock nighttime search warrants 
without deference to those who have drafted and signed and perhaps 
read those documents before. Constitution of Utah, Article I 
section 14. 
The State argues that this issue was waived because it was 
not presented to the trial court by trial counsel. Brief of 
Respondent at 11-13. The trial court has no authority over this 
Court's standards of review, and the fact that the trial court did 
not have the opportunity to address this issue is irrelevant. 
II. 
THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE 
OR A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT. 
The State argues that there is no particularity problem 
with search warrant and affidavit, stating, "Clearly, apartment 3720 
was to be searched; apartment 3718 was to be left alone." Brief of 
respondent at 19. The particularity of the warrant is for this 
Court decide, by reading, with an eye to the dangers posed by 
no-knock nighttime searches, the description of the premises to be 
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searched contained in the warrant and affidavit: 
the premises known as 3720 South 3375 West, the 
duplex on the west side of the road, 3720 is the 
southern most half of the duplex, the apartment 
to the north has the numbers 3718 on the front of 
the premises, to include all containers, rooms, 
attics, and basements found therein. 
(R. 25). 
The State dismisses Mr. White's argument that pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-3, the warrant should not have issued 
unless the magistrate found that the search could not be performed 
by subpoena, and unless the magistrate tailored the scope of the 
warrant to protect the rights of the residents of the premises to be 
searched who were not probable cause suspects. The State does not 
address the magistrate's failure to tailor the scope of the search, 
but argues that the subpoena finding required by the statute would 
have been superfluous, stating, 
Briefly, it seems unlikely that someone suspected 
of dealing in illicit drugs would comply with a 
subpoena requiring him or her to surrender 
evidence of such activity. Indeed, unless such a 
person were foolish beyond belief, he or she 
would be expected, upon receiving such a 
subpoena, to expeditiously conceal or destroy 
such evidence. Recitation of the likely failure 
of the subpoena process, then hardly seems 
necessary in a case like this one. 
Respondent's brief at 19. 
This argument would best be made to the legislature who 
enacted section 77-23-3 into law. 
The State argument is flawed, in that it assumes that the 
subpoena would go to a probable cause suspect, who would be unlikely 
to incriminate himself. The whole point of the statute is that 
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innocent people may be jeopardized by their proximity to evidence, 
and should be protected from unnecessary or unreasonable searches 
and seizures. The warrant in this case authorized a no-knock 
nighttime search of a residence, without alleging any probable cause 
suspects. In fact, the two residents listed on utility bills, as 
indicated in the affidavit, Brian Zeleniak and Cullen McCarty, were 
not charged. Innocent citizens are unnecessarily put at risk in 
circumstances such as these, wherein a magistrate rubberstamped a 
no-knock nighttime search warrant. 
While it is true that trial counsel did not address the 
lack of particularity of the search warrant, Respondent's brief at 
18-19, this Court does not review the analysis of trial courts in 
assessing the issuance of search warrants, but simply reviews the 
warrants and affidavits. E.g. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah 
App. 1991). The errors are plain on the face of the warrant and 
affidavit, and in light of the governing law. The particularity 
errors constitute constitutional violations, and are therefore 
prejudicial. See State v. Rowe. 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 15 (Utah 
1992)(defining constitutional violations as prejudicial). This 
Court should reach these errors under the plain error doctrine, in 
the event that traditional waiver doctrines become applicable to 
review of the issuance of search warrants. See State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989)(plain errors meriting reversal on appeal 
in the absence of an objection in the trial court are those that are 
harmful ("there is a reasonable likelihood that the errors affected 
the outcome"), and should have been obvious to the trial court); 
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State v, Eldredcre. 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah) ("[T]he more harmful 
an error is, the more likely an appellate court is to conclude that 
it was objectively obvious, because a high degree of harmfulness 
might be expected to attract a trial court's attention. On the 
other hand, in appropriate cases we can exercise our discretion to 
dispense with the requirement of obviousness so that justice can be 
done, as when an error not readily apparent to the court or counsel 
proves harmful in retrospect."), cert, denied. 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). 
In seeking to demonstrate the reliability of the 
confidential informants in the affidavit, the State argues that the 
confidential informants should be viewed as reliable citizen 
informants, speculating that the confidential informants were 
motivated by love and concern for the spouse who was buying 
cocaine. Respondent's brief at 17. Such speculation is unfounded 
in the affidavit. In fact, it appears from the affidavit that the 
first confidential informant may have been in jeopardy for arranging 
to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, a second degree 
felony. Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) and (b)(i). The 
confidential informants' credibility is hardly buttressed by the 
fact that the spouse had been arrested for some narcotics charge 
before, or the detective's observation of what he perceived as drug 
traffic around the "named premises." An arrest does not indicate 
guilt, and the suspicious traffic alleged in the affidavit is not 
tied to either side of the duplex, and is equally consistent with 
tupperware dealings as with dealings in illegal drugs. 
On pages 16 through 17 of the Respondent's brief, the State 
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argues that because the trial court generously allowed the 
presentation of evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress 
and because the police generously identified the confidential 
informants, counsel for Mr. White should have presented and examined 
the confidential informants to demonstrate their unreliability. 
Respondents brief at 16-17. The motion to suppress was based on 
the magistrate's improper issuance of the no-knock nighttime search 
warrant (R. 21-23). Presentation and examination of evidence in 
addition to the search warrant and affidavit was therefore 
unnecessary. E.g., Gates. supra. While the prosecutor did not 
object to the unnecessary testimony of Detective McCarthy, this did 
not create a burden for Mr. White to present additional irrelevant 
witnesses. 
The State argues in summary in point one of its brief that 
the totality of the circumstances provide a substantial basis for 
the magistrate's issuance of the search warrant. Respondent's brief 
at 19-20. What the State fails to address in this summary is that 
the magistrate issued a no-knock nighttime search Wcirrant to search 
a residence that was ambiguously described in the warrant, and 
apparently occupied by innocent citizens. The affidavit failed to 
protect the constitutional and statutory rights of these citizens, 
or to establish the reliability of the confidential informants, who 
had never witnessed any drug transactions in the residence. If 
these factors are properly overlooked under the deferential 
"substantial basis" test, this is further reason for this Court to 
reject the federal standard and rule under Article I section 14 of 
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the Utah Constitution that in reviewing no-knock nighttime search 
warrants, this Court will review without deference for probable 
cause. 
III. 
THE MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT HAVE AUTHORIZED 
A NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH. 
The State argues that no-knock authorizations should not 
have to meet the probable cause standard, but should be issued with 
deference to the police requesting the authorizations, if the 
officers present "some evidence" justifying the authorizations. 
Respondent's brief at 20-22. 
The State and Federal Constitutions both explicitly require 
reasonable searches and probable cause for all search warrants. 
Because no-knock searches are more intrusive, more dangerous and 
more prone to constitutional unreasonableness than other searches, 
the constitutions and logic compel as a minimum a showing of 
probable cause to justify no-knock search warrants, and certainly do 
not tolerate the miniscule "some evidence" standard proposed by the 
State. See generally Lafave, Search and Seizure, §§4.7 and 4.8 at 
pages 260, 263-276, 270-280, 287-290; supplement, §4.8 at 49-54. 
The case the State cites in support of its "some evidence" 
standard is inapposite. In Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 
(1979), cited in respondent's brief at 21, the Court held, in 
pertinent part, that the Fourth Amendment did not require courts 
issuing wiretap orders under federal law to explicitly authorize 
covert entry for installation of the wiretap equipment. Id. at 
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257-259. Dalia's holding does not support the argument that 
magistrates should defer to the police in no-knock nighttime search 
warrant cases, because the facts at issue in wiretapping are 
different from the facts at issue in no-knock nighttime cases. 
Covert entry is essential to any successful wiretap and would 
necessarily be considered by a judge issuing a wiretap order, and 
covert entry does not pose the dangers that inhere in no-knock 
nighttime searches. See LaFave, Search and Seizure, supplement §4.8 
at 53-54. 
The State also argues that Mr. White failed to present 
evidence for an adequate consideration of the reasonableness of the 
no-knock search. Respondent's brief at 24-25. Again, Mr. White was 
not moving to suppress the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable 
search; he was moving to suppress the evidence because the no-knock 
nighttime search was not supported by probable cause (R. 21-23). 
Mr. White had no burden to present evidence relating to the 
reasonableness of the search, for he was raising a separate 
constitutional issue. See e.g. Utah Constitution Article I section 
14 (requiring both reasonable searches and the proper issuance of 
warrants); United States Constitution, Amendment IV (same); State v. 
Ayala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah App. 1988)(defendant challenged 
search warrant for lack of probable cause established in the 
supporting affidavit, and the reasonableness of the search of his 
person). 
The State concedes that because the Detective McCarthy's 
affidavit did not seek narcotics, but only packaging materials and 
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other proof a "a major sales operation," the no-knock issuance 
cannot be supported by the theory that the authorization was 
necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. Respondent's 
brief at 23-24. Apparently, the State is conceding that the search 
warrant affidavit incorrectly indicated that "the property sought 
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted." (R. 34). The 
magistrate signed off on this warrant, and the trial court affirmed 
the issuance of the warrant on the basis that cocaine, which was not 
sought in the affidavit, is readily destructible (T. 67). Again, 
the facts of this case demonstrate that the police, magistrates, and 
trial courts need guidance, not deference, from this Court. 
The State argues that the no-knock authorization was 
justified by Detective McCarthy's personal feeling that no-knock 
searches are always safer in drug cases. Respondent's brief at 22. 
While it is true that Utah's appellate courts have recognized that 
narcotics dealers are frequently armed, id., innocent people are 
frequently armed in this State with the broadest state 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms in the nation. See reply 
brief of appellant in State v. Archambeau. Case no. 900564-CA. 
The State's argument overlooks the fact that Utah and 
Federal Constitutional law require magistrates to evaluate the 
issuance of warrants on the basis of actual facts from which the 
magistrates can draw their own conclusions. Allen v. Lindbeck, 
Gates, supra. 
The State characterizes as "slender" the dangers posed by 
the vague threats from the alleged cocaine dealers to the spouse, 
-11-
and from the spouse to the confidential informant, but cites State 
v, Rovbal. 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), for the proposition that the 
detective's no-knock authorization request was reasonable and 
sufficient to justify the no-knock authorization. Respondent's 
brief at 23. The Roybal case is inapposite because it involved a 
Terry frisk# rather than the issuance of a warrant, and involved a 
much heavier, much more specific and more imminent danger to the 
officer than is reflected in this affidavit. Compare the White 
Affidavit at 31 ("CI told your affiant that the CI has been 
threatened by the spouse if the CI came forward to the police with 
the information provided. Further the CI was told by the spouse 
that the supplier of the cocaine has threatened the spouse when the 
spouse has been late in repaying for cocaine that was received by 
the spouse.) with Rovbal at 292 (Officer responded to residence at 
2:00 a.m. to investigate family fight, where shots were fired, 
defendant was arrested and later frisked on the street by police who 
thought he was still in custody; gun from fight was never recovered 
and defendant appeared to be hiding something when he was frisked). 
Generalized stereotypical suspicions such are alleged in 
this affidavit are insufficient to justify breaking into this 
residence. Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10. 
The State is persuasive in its argument that the daytime 
execution of this search warrant rendered harmless the erroneous 
nighttime authorization. Respondent's brief at 25-27. However, the 
magistrate who signed this warrant must be informed for safety's 
sake that the legislature's prerequisites to the issuance of 
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no-knock nighttime search warrants are law which the magistrate must 
follow. This Court should publish an opinion to this effect. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of 
Mr. White's motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /// day of Nov., 1992. 
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